Philosophical Studies 45 (May):353-368 (1984)
|Abstract||I argue that being wide awake is an epistemic virtue which enables me to recognize immediately that I'm wide awake. Also I argue that dreams are imaginings and that the wide awake mind can immediately discern the difference between imaginings and vivid sense experience. Descartes need only pinch himself.|
|Keywords||Certainty Dreaming Epistemology|
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