How (not) to be a reductionist in a complex universe
| Abstract | This paper understands reductionism as a relation between explanations, not theories. It argues that knowledge of the micro-level behavior of the components of systems is necessary, but only combined with a full specification of the contingent context sufficient for a full explanation of systems phenomena. The paper takes seriously fundamental principles independent and transcendent of the laws of quantum mechanics that govern most of real-world phenomena. It will conclude in showing how the recent postgenomic revolution, taking seriously the physical principle of organization and collective behavior, can be understood as attempting to complement a reductionist investigative strategy with an antireductionist explanatory strategy. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Only published papers are available at libraries |
Similar books and articlesHolger Lyre (2009). The “Multirealization” of Multiple Realizability. In A. Hieke & H. Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction - Abstraction - Analysis. Ontos.
Peter A. Corning (2012). The Re-Emergence of Emergence, and the Causal Role of Synergy in Emergent Evolution. Synthese 185 (2):295-317.
Robert C. Richardson (2001). Complexity, Self-Organization and Selection. Biology and Philosophy 16 (5).
Daniel Steel (2004). Can a Reductionist Be a Pluralist? Biology and Philosophy 19 (1):55-73.
Andrew Melnyk (1995). Two Cheers for Reductionism, or, the Dim Prospects for Nonreductive Materialism. Philosophy of Science 62 (3):370-88.
Robert M. Galatzer-Levy (2005). Exploring Psychological Complexity Through Dynamic Systems Theory: A Complement to Reductionism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):206-207.
Andrea Bonaccorsi (2010). New Forms of Complementarity in Science. Minerva 48 (4):355-387.
Anthony Walsh (1997). Methodological Individualism and Vertical Integration in the Social Sciences. Behavior and Philosophy 25 (2):121 - 136.
Andreas Hüttemann (2005). Explanation, Emergence and Quantum-Entanglement. Philosophy of Science 72 (1):114-127.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads16 ( #74,716 of 549,122 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,361 of 549,122 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
