David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006)
Ignorance and Imagination advances a novel way to resolve the central philosophical problem about the mind: how it is that consciousness or experience fits into a larger naturalistic picture of the world. The correct response to the problem, Stoljar argues, is not to posit a realm of experience distinct from the physical, nor to deny the reality of phenomenal experience, nor even to rethink our understanding of consciousness and the language we use to talk about it. Instead, we should view the problem itself as a consequence of our ignorance of the relevant physical facts. Stoljar shows that this change of orientation is well motivated historically, empirically, and philosophically, and that it has none of the side effects it is sometimes thought to have. The result is a philosophical perspective on the mind that has a number of far-reaching consequences: for consciousness studies, for our place in nature, and for the way we think about the relationship between philosophy and science.
|Keywords||A Posteriori A Priori Consciousness Epistemology Ignorance Imagination|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$15.50 new (83% off) $20.52 used (78% off) $85.50 direct from Amazon (5% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||B808.9.S725 2006|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Tristram McPherson (2011). Against Quietist Normative Realism. Philosophical Studies 154 (2):223-240.
Pär Sundström (2011). Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.
Tyler Doggett & Daniel Stoljar (2010). Does Nagel's Footnote Eleven Solve the Mind-Body Problem? Philosophical Issues 20 (1):125-143.
Torin Alter (2009). Does the Ignorance Hypothesis Undermine the Conceivability and Knowledge Arguments? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):756-765.
Daniel Stoljar (2007). Consequences of Intentionalism. Erkenntnis (Special Issue) 66 (1-2):247--70.
Similar books and articles
Kelly Trogdon (2009). Daniel Stoljar, Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 118 (2):269-273.
Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2008). Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness - by Daniel Stoljar. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 49 (3):274-275.
Kelly Trogdon (2009). Daniel Stoljar, Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 118 (2).
Brie Gertler (2009). The Role of Ignorance in the Problem of Consciousness: Critical Review of Daniel Stoljar, Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness (Oxford University Press, 2006). Noûs 43 (2):378-393.
Patricia S. Churchland (1996). The Hornswoggle Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):402-8.
Raamy Majeed (2013). Pleading Ignorance in Response to Experiential Primitivism. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):251-269.
Cam Clayton (2012). The Psychical Analogon in Sartre's Theory of the Imagination. Sartre Studies International 17 (2):16-27.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads51 ( #30,132 of 1,096,602 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #24,329 of 1,096,602 )
How can I increase my downloads?