If we accept that Mary the colour scientist gains new knowledge when she sees the colour red for the first time must this lead us to a non-physicalist theory of consciousness?

PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 16 (1):16-19 (2010)
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Abstract

We experience the world as perceivers armed with many different sense modalities. These modalities include sight, sound, touch, smell, and taste, each giving an array of sensations and feelings to our phenomenology. How these sensations and feelings come to be is the central concern of the so-called “hard problem” of qualitative experience

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Victoria Stone
University of Edinburgh

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References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
What is it Like to be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.

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