David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 54 (2):244-255 (1987)
In this paper I attempt to tie together a longstanding dispute between Henry Kyburg and Isaac Levi concerning statistical inferences. The debate, which centers around the example of Petersen the Swede, concerns Kyburg's and Levi's accounts of randomness and choosing reference classes. I argue that both Kyburg and Levi have missed the real significance of their dispute, that Levi's claim that Kyburg violates Confirmational Conditionalization is insufficient, and that Kyburg has failed to show that Levi's criteria for choosing reference class are problematic. Rather, the significance of the Petersen case is to show that other aspects of their respective systems are defective: for Levi his account of credal judgments other than direct inference, and for Kyburg his explanation of how indexes are associated with a body of knowledge
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Paul D. Thorn (2012). Two Problems of Direct Inference. Erkenntnis 76 (3):299-318.
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