David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Consciousness and Cognition 10 (4):574-587 (2001)
GY, an extensively studied human hemianope, is aware of salient visual events in his cortically blind field but does not call this ''vision.'' To learn whether he has low-level conscious visual sensations or whether instead he has gained conscious knowledge about, or access to, visual information that does not produce a conscious phenomenal sensation, we attempted to image process a stimulus s presented to the impaired field so that when the transformed stimulus T(s) was presented to the normal hemifield it would cause a sensation similar to that caused by s in the impaired field. While degradation of contrast, spatio-temporal filtering, contrast reversal, and addition of smear and random blobs all failed to match the response to a flashed bar sf, moving textures of low contrast were accepted to match the response to a moving contrast-defined bar, sm. Orientation and motion direction discrimination of the perceptually matched stimuli [sm and T(sm)] was closely similar. We suggest that the existence of a satisfactory match indicates that GY has phenomenal vision
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Berit Brogaard (2011). Color Experience in Blindsight? Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):767 - 786.
Berit Brogaard (2011). Are There Unconscious Perceptual Processes? Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):449-63.
Berit Brogaard (2012). Non-Visual Consciousness and Visual Images in Blindsight. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):595-596.
Morten Overgaard & Thor Grünbaum (2011). Consciousness and Modality: On the Possible Preserved Visual Consciousness in Blindsight Subjects. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1855-1859.
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