On believing that I am thinking

It is argued that a second-order belief to the effect that I now have some particular propositional attitude is always true (Incorrigibility). This is not because we possess an infallible cognitive faculty of introspection, but because that x believes that he himself now has attitude A to proposition P entails that x has A to P. Incorrigibility applies only to second-order beliefs and not to mere linguistic avowals of attitudes. This view combines a necessary asymmetry between 1st and 3rd person ascriptions with Objectivism about the propositional attitudes. The epistemic justification of second-order beliefs is shown to be a further question
Keywords Belief  Epistemology  Proposition  Thinking  Descartes
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-9264.00028
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 22,184
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Finn Spicer (2009). On Always Being Right (About What One is Thinking). Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):pp. 137-160.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Michael Bergmann (2006). Epistemic Circularity and Common Sense: A Reply to Reed. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):198-207.
John Zeis (2006). Evidentialism and Faith: Believing in Order to Know. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:185-200.
Robert Audi (2008). Belief, Faith, and Acceptance. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 63 (1/3):87 - 102.
Roger Fellows (2000). Animal Belief. Philosophy 75 (294):587-599.
Adam Leite (2004). On Justifying and Being Justified. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):219–253.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

23 ( #175,023 of 1,934,852 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #270,038 of 1,934,852 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.