On believing that I am thinking

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):125-44 (1998)
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Abstract

It is argued that a second-order belief to the effect that I now have some particular propositional attitude is always true (Incorrigibility). This is not because we possess an infallible cognitive faculty of introspection, but because that x believes that he himself now has attitude A to proposition P entails that x has A to P. Incorrigibility applies only to second-order beliefs and not to mere linguistic avowals of attitudes. This view combines a necessary asymmetry between 1st and 3rd person ascriptions with Objectivism about the propositional attitudes. The epistemic justification of second-order beliefs is shown to be a further question

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Tom Stoneham
University of York

Citations of this work

On Always being Right (about What One is Thinking).Finn Spicer - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):137-160.
Reasoning and Self-Knowledge.Martin Francisco Fricke - 2018 - Análisis Filosófico 38 (1):33-55.
La primera certeza de Descartes.Martin Francisco Fricke - 2014 - In Dávalos Patricia King, González Juan Carlos González & de Luna Eduardo González (eds.), Ciencias cognitivas y filosofía. Entre la cooperación y la integración. Universidad Autónoma de Queretaro and Miguel Ángel Porrúa. pp. 99-115.

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