Physicalism and phenomenal concepts

Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302 (2005)
Abstract A phenomenal concept is the concept of a particular type of sensory or perceptual experience, where the notion of experience is understood phenomenologically. A recent and increasingly influential idea in philosophy of mind suggests that reflection on these concepts will play a major role in the debate about conscious experience, and in particular in the defense of physicalism, the thesis that psychological truths supervene on physical truths. According to this idea
Keywords Epistemology  Phenomena  Physicalism  Sense Data
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