Physicalism and phenomenal concepts
Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302 (2005)
| Abstract | A phenomenal concept is the concept of a particular type of sensory or perceptual experience, where the notion of experience is understood phenomenologically. A recent and increasingly influential idea in philosophy of mind suggests that reflection on these concepts will play a major role in the debate about conscious experience, and in particular in the defense of physicalism, the thesis that psychological truths supervene on physical truths. According to this idea | |||||||||
| Keywords | Epistemology Phenomena Physicalism Sense Data | |||||||||
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