Should Moore have followed his own method? [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 129 (3):609 - 618 (2006)
I discuss Soames’s proposal that Moore could have avoided a central problem in his moral philosophy if he had utilized a method he himself pioneered in epistemology. The problem in Moore’s moral philosophy concerns what it is for a moral claim to be self-evident. The method in Moore’s epistemology concerns not denying the obvious. In review of the distance between something’s being self-evident and its being obvious, it is suggested that Soames’s proposal is mistaken.
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References found in this work BETA
G. E. Moore (1903/2004). Principia Ethica. Dover Publications.
George Edward Moore (1925). A Defence of Common Sense. In J. H. Muirhead (ed.), Contemporary British Philosophy, Second Series. George Allen and Unwin.
George Edward Moore (1939). Proof of an External World. Proceedings of the British Academy 25 (5):273--300.
W. D. Ross (2002). The Right and the Good. Clarendon Press.
Scott Soames (2003). Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century. Princeton University Press.
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