Sakya pandita and the status of concepts

Philosophy East and West 56 (4):567-582 (2006)
: The thirteenth-century Tibetan thinker Sakya Pandita was a diehard supporter of nominalism with respect to abstract entities. Here, two arguments given by Sakya Pandita against the robust existence of concepts (don spyi) are analyzed and elucidated. The first argument is rooted in the Buddhist idea that conceptual thought is unsound, whereas the second argument arises from considerations of intersubjectivity and verification. By presenting these arguments we gain both a fuller picture of the central role played by concepts within the Tibetan tradition of philosophy of mind and a better appreciation of the philosophical acuity of the Tibetan polymath Sakya Pandita
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DOI 10.1353/pew.2006.0064
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Jonathan Stoltz (2006). Concepts, Intension, and Identity in Tibetan Philosophy of Language. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 29 (2):383-400.

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