David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In M. Escurdia, Robert J. Stainton & Christopher D. Viger (eds.), Language, Mind and World: Special Issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy. University of Alberta Press. 341--90 (2004)
1. Introduction In ‘The Refutation of Idealism’, G.E.Moore observed that, "when we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous" (1922; p.25). Many philosophers, but Gilbert Harman (1990, 1996) in particular, have suggested that this observation forms the basis of an argument against qualia, usually called the argument from diaphanousness or transparency.1 But even its friends concede that it is none too clear what the argument from diaphanousness—as I will call it—is (Tye 2000; p.45).2 The purpose of this paper is to formulate the argument, and to assess its merits. My conclusion will be that qualia realists have little to fear from the argument—provided both qualia and diaphanousness are properly understood
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Rocco J. Gennaro (2008). Representationalism, Peripheral Awareness, and the Transparency of Experience. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):39-56.
Neil Mehta (2013). Is There a Phenomenological Argument for Higher-Order Representationalism? Philosophical Studies 164 (2):357-370.
Janet Levin (2012). Tye's Ptolemaic Revolution (Review of Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts). Analytic Philosophy 53 (1):98-117.
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