The conceivability argument and two conceptions of the physical

Philosophical Perspectives 15 (s15):393-413 (2001)
The conceivability argument against physicalism1 starts from the prem- ises that: It is conceivable that I have a zombie-twin, i.e., that there is someone who is physically identical to me and yet who lacks phenomenal con- sciousness; and If it is conceivable that I have a zombie-twin, then it is possible that I have a zombie-twin. These premises entail that physicalism is false, for physicalism is the claim—or can be assumed for our purposes to be the claim2—that
Keywords Conceivability  Concept  Metaphysics  Modality  Physicalism
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DOI 10.1111/0029-4624.35.s15.18
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