Two conceivability arguments compared

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):27-44 (2007)
Abstract
The conclusion of this argument entails the falsity of physicalism because, technical details aside, physicalism is or entails the thesis that every psychological truth is entailed by some physical truth. If it is possible that I have a zombie duplicate however, then it is possible that the physical truths are as they are and some psychological truth is different. Hence 3 entails that physicalism is false. The second conceivability argument is one that is almost as famous, though perhaps it is less famous for being a conceivability argument: the perfect actor argument against behaviorism . In a version that is both familiar and relatively clear, it goes like this
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00210.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 21,305
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Thomas Nagel (1979). Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press.
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
E. Diaz-Leon (2012). Actors Are Not Like Zombies. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):115-122.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Andrew Botterell (2001). Conceiving What is Not There. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (8):21-42.
Katalin Balog (1998). Conceivability Arguments. Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

115 ( #34,354 of 1,911,102 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #96,280 of 1,911,102 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.