David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):27-44 (2007)
The conclusion of this argument entails the falsity of physicalism because, technical details aside, physicalism is or entails the thesis that every psychological truth is entailed by some physical truth. If it is possible that I have a zombie duplicate however, then it is possible that the physical truths are as they are and some psychological truth is different. Hence 3 entails that physicalism is false. The second conceivability argument is one that is almost as famous, though perhaps it is less famous for being a conceivability argument: the perfect actor argument against behaviorism . In a version that is both familiar and relatively clear, it goes like this
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Thomas Nagel (1979/2012). Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press.
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.
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Citations of this work BETA
Alexander Carruth (forthcoming). Powerful Qualities, Zombies and Inconceivability. Philosophical Quarterly:pqv055.
David Wall (2009). Are There Passive Desires? Dialectica 63 (2):133-155.
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