David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):27-44 (2007)
The conclusion of this argument (hereafter ZA) entails the falsity of physicalism because, technical details aside, physicalism is or entails the thesis that every psychological truth is entailed by some physical truth. If it is possible that I have a zombie duplicate however, then it is possible that the physical truths are as they are and some psychological truth is different. Hence 3 entails that physicalism is false. The second conceivability argument is one that is almost as famous, though perhaps it is less famous for being a conceivability argument: the perfect actor argument against behaviorism (see, e.g., Putnam 1963, 1975). In a version that is both familiar and relatively clear, it goes like this
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
David Wall (2009). Are There Passive Desires? Dialectica 63 (2):133-155.
Similar books and articles
Karol Polcyn (2006). Conceivability, Possibility, and a Posteriori Necessity: On Chalmers' Argument for Dualism. Diametros 7 (March):37-55.
Jesper Kallestrup (2006). Physicalism, Conceivability and Strong Necessities. Synthese 151 (2):273-295.
Stephen Law (2004). Loar's Defence of Physicalism. Ratio 17 (1):60-67.
Amir Horowitz (2009). Turning the Zombie on its Head. Synthese 170 (1):191 - 210.
Katalin Balog (1999). Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.
Daniel Stoljar (2001). The Conceivability Argument and Two Conceptions of the Physical. Philosophical Perspectives 15 (s15):393-413.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads94 ( #14,671 of 1,140,006 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #92,708 of 1,140,006 )
How can I increase my downloads?