Two conceptions of the physical
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):253-81 (2001)
| Abstract | The debate over physicalism in philosophy of mind can be seen as concerning an inconsistent tetrad of theses: (1) if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; (2) a priori physicalism is false; (3) if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true; (4) epiphenomenalism is false. This paper argues that one may resolve the debate by distinguishing two conceptions of the physical: on the theory-based conception | |||||||||
| Keywords | Falsity Metaphysics Mind Physical | |||||||||
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