The purpose of analysis in Moore's principia ethica

Inquiry 9 (1-4):156 – 170 (1966)
Abstract
After distinguishing two senses of 'analysis', the author claims that the purpose of Moore's analytical (meta-ethical) program in Principia Ethica was to serve as an indispensable tool for avoiding false judgments in substantial ethics and for establishing true ones. It is shown that Moore's analyses and assumptions are not normatively neutral in that, (1) he disagreed with other philosophers about the extension (as well as the intension) of moral terms, (2) he disagreed in extension with 'common-sense' morality. Finally, an attempt is made to show that Moore's moral methodology, in which his analytical distinctions play the crucial part, is meant to be of practical value for everybody in their moral decisions.
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References found in this work BETA
E. F. Carritt (1928/1974). The Theory of Morals. Westport, Conn.,Greenwood Press.
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