Things that happen because they should: a teleological approach to action

New York: Oxford University Press (1996)
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Abstract

Rowland Stout presents a new philosophical account of human action which is radically and controversially different from all rival theories. He argues that intentional actions are unique among natural phenomena in that they happen because they should happen, and that they are to be explained in terms of objective facts rather than beliefs and intentions.

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Rowland Stout
University College Dublin

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