'Unlucky' Gettier Cases

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):421-430 (2013)
This article argues that justified true beliefs in Gettier cases often are not true due to luck. I offer two ‘unlucky’ Gettier cases, and it's easy enough to generate more. Hence even attaching a broad ‘anti-luck’ codicil to the tripartite account of knowledge leaves the Gettier problem intact. Also, two related questions are addressed. First, if epistemic luck isn't distinctive of Gettier cases, what is? Second, what do Gettier cases reveal about knowledge?
Keywords Gettier cases, epistemic luck,veritical luck.  epistemology
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12006
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References found in this work BETA
Gilbert Harman (1973). Thought. Princeton University Press.
Alvin Goldman (1976). Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.

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