David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):174-191 (2005)
This paper argues that there are no people. If identity isn't what matters in survival, psychological connectedness isn't what matters either. Further, fissioning cases do not support the claim that connectedness is what matters. I consider Peter Unger's view that what matters is a continuous physical realization of a core psychology. I conclude that if identity isn't what matters in survival, nothing matters. This conclusion is deployed to argue that there are no people. Objections to Eliminativism are considered, especially that morality cannot survive the loss of persons
|Keywords||Connectedness Eliminativism Epistemology Identity Survival|
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References found in this work BETA
Owen J. Flanagan, Ned Block & Guven Guzeldere (eds.) (1997). The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press.
Thomas Nagel (1979/2012). Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press.
Eric T. Olson (1997). The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. Oxford University Press.
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Derek A. Parfit (1987). Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons. In Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (eds.), Mindwaves. Blackwell.
Citations of this work BETA
Jim Stone (2007). Persons Are Not Made of Temporal Parts. Analysis 67 (1):7–11.
Jens Johansson (2007). Non-Reductionism and Special Concern. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):641 – 657.
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