Are normative properties descriptive properties?

Philosophical Studies 154 (3):325 - 348 (2011)
Some philosophers think that normative properties are identical to descriptive properties. In this paper, I argue that this entails that it is possible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I argue that Frank Jackson's argument to show that this is possible fails, and that the objections to this argument show that it is impossible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I conclude that normative properties are not identical to descriptive properties. I then show that if we combine this conclusion with the conclusion of a different argument that Jackson has given to show that there are no irreducibly normative properties, it follows that there are no normative properties at all
Keywords Normative properties  Descriptive properties
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DOI 10.2307/41487671
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

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Stephen Ingram (2015). After Moral Error Theory, After Moral Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):227-248.
Philip Brown (2013). The Possibility of Morality. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):627-636.
Wouter F. Kalf (2015). Are Moral Properties Impossible? Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1869-1887.

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