David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 154 (3):325 - 348 (2011)
Some philosophers think that normative properties are identical to descriptive properties. In this paper, I argue that this entails that it is possible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I argue that Frank Jackson's argument to show that this is possible fails, and that the objections to this argument show that it is impossible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I conclude that normative properties are not identical to descriptive properties. I then show that if we combine this conclusion with the conclusion of a different argument that Jackson has given to show that there are no irreducibly normative properties, it follows that there are no normative properties at all
|Keywords||Normative properties Descriptive properties|
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References found in this work BETA
Richard Boyd (1988). How to Be a Moral Realist. In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press. 181-228.
David O. Brink (1984). Moral Realism and the Sceptical Arguments From Disagreement and Queerness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):111 – 125.
David Owen Brink (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
Campbell Brown (2011). A New and Improved Supervenience Argument for Ethical Descriptivism. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 6. Oup Oxford. 205-18.
Jonathan Dancy (2004). Discussion on the Importance of Making Things Right. Ratio 17 (2):229–237.
Citations of this work BETA
Philip Brown (2013). The Possibility of Morality. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):627-636.
Bart Streumer (2013). Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World? Ratio 26 (4):450-470.
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