Graduate studies at Western
Topoi 22 (1):93-104 (2003)
|Abstract||The early formal logicians (Frege, Russell, Peano et al.) were worried about differentiating logic from psychology. As a result, they interpreted logic in the most abstract way possible: as a theory about inference patterns whose terms lacked descriptive content. Such a theory was also acontextual. What they did not realize was that psychological concepts like expecting someone, doubting, pain etc. each had their own logic, a logic that had two features: it was contextually oriented and its concepts had a restricted sensible application. This is still a recognizable sense of logic but broader in scope than the conceptions that Frege and Russell had in mind.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Tom Burke (1994). Dewey's New Logic: A Reply to Russell. University of Chicago Press.
Daniele Mezzadri (2010). Language and Logic in Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Dissertation, University of Stirling
Don Emil Herget (1987). Non-Standard Categorical Syllogisms: Four That Leibniz Forgot. History and Philosophy of Logic 8 (1):1-13.
David Dinsmore Comey (1966). Current Trends in Soviet Logic. Inquiry 9 (1-4):94 – 108.
Edward N. Zalta, Frege's Logic, Theorem, and Foundations for Arithmetic. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Paul Oppenheimer & Edward N. Zalta (2011). Relations Vs Functions at the Foundations of Logic: Type-Theoretic Considerations. Journal of Logic and Computation 21:351-374.
T. Achourioti & M. van Lambalgen (forthcoming). A Formalisation of Kant's Transcendental Logic. Review of Symbolic Logic.
Carlo Cellucci (1998). The Scope of Logic: Deduction, Abduction, Analogy. Theoria 64 (2-3):217-242.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads13 ( #95,562 of 723,067 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,087 of 723,067 )
How can I increase my downloads?