David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 32 (March):3-27 (1989)
This article begins with some brief reflexions on the definition of determinism (II), on the notion of the subject of experience (III), and on the relation between conscious experience and brain events (IV). The main discussion (V?XIII) focuses on the traditional view, endorsed by Honderich in his book A Theory of Determinism, that the truth of determinism poses some special threat to our ordinary conception of ourselves as morally responsible free agents (and also to our ?life?hopes'). It is argued that this is half right: the truth of determinism does indeed threaten certain vital parts of our ordinary conception of ourselves as morally responsible free agents. The trouble is that the falsity of determinism does not diminish the threat in any useful way. The old, natural, and recurrent mistake is to think that we would really be better off, so far as free will and moral responsibility (and our ?life?hopes') were concerned, if determinism were false. It is argued that there is no important sense in which this is true, and that the question of whether determinism is true or false is therefore of no real importance, so far as the free will debate is concerned
|Keywords||Consciousness Determinism Free Will Metaphysics Honderich, T|
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Citations of this work BETA
Randolph Clarke (2005). On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):13-24.
Stephen Kershnar (2015). Moral Responsibility and Foundationalism. Philosophia 43 (2):381-402.
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Ted Honderich (forthcoming). Effects, Determinism, Neither Compatibilism nor Incompatibilism, Consciousness. Philosophical Explorations.
Peter van Inwagen (1975). The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism. Philosophical Studies 27 (March):185-99.
Noa Latham (2004). Determinism, Randomness, and Value. Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):153-167.
Kadri Vihvelin, Arguments for Incompatibilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Ted Honderich (1990). The Consequences of Determinism: A Theory of Determinism, Volume 2. Clarendon Press.
Ted Honderich (2002). How Free Are You? The Determinism Problem. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), Philosophical Quarterly. Oxford University Press 249.
Peter van Inwagen (1983). An Essay on Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Göran Duus-Otterström (2008). Betting Against Hard Determinism. Res Publica 14 (3):219-235.
Bruce Bassoff (1964). Free Will and Determinism. Journal of Existentialism 4:259-262.
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