Can We Believe the Error Theory?

Journal of Philosophy 110 (4):194-212 (2013)
Abstract
According to the error theory, normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, even though such properties do not exist. In this paper, I argue that we cannot believe the error theory, and that this means that there is no reason for us to believe this theory. It may be thought that this is a problem for the error theory, but I argue that it is not. Instead, I argue, our inability to believe the error theory undermines many objections that have been made to this theory.
Keywords Error theory
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Citations of this work BETA
Philip Brown (2013). The Possibility of Morality. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):627-636.
Andy Egan (2012). Relativist Dispositional Theories of Value. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):557-582.

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