Philosophical Studies 154 (4):325 - 348 (2011)
|Abstract||According to the error theory, normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties to objects, even though such properties do not exist. In this paper, I argue that we cannot fully believe the error theory, and that this means that there is no reason for us to fully believe this theory. It may be thought that this is a problem for the error theory, but I argue that it is not. Instead, I argue, our inability to fully believe the error theory undermines many objections that have been made to this theory.|
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