Freedom and Belief

Oxford University Press (1986)
Abstract
On the whole, we continue to believe firmly both that we have free will and that we are morally responsible for what we do. Here, the author argues that there is a fundamental sense in which there is no such thing as free will or true moral responsibility (as ordinarily understood). Devoting the main body of his book to an attempt to explain why we continue to believe as we do, Strawson examines various aspects of the "cognitive phenomenology" of freedom--the nature, causes, and consequences of our deep commitment to belief in freedom.
Keywords Belief  Choice  Commitment  Experience  Freedom  Metaphysics  Objectivism  Subjectivism  Truth  Kant
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Call number BJ1461.S77 1986
ISBN(s) 0199247501   9780199247493   9780199247509  
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Tamler Sommers (2009). More Work for Hard Incompatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):511-521.

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