David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (1986)
On the whole, we continue to believe firmly both that we have free will and that we are morally responsible for what we do. Here, the author argues that there is a fundamental sense in which there is no such thing as free will or true moral responsibility (as ordinarily understood). Devoting the main body of his book to an attempt to explain why we continue to believe as we do, Strawson examines various aspects of the "cognitive phenomenology" of freedom--the nature, causes, and consequences of our deep commitment to belief in freedom.
|Keywords||Belief Choice Commitment Experience Freedom Metaphysics Objectivism Subjectivism Truth Kant|
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|Buy the book||$13.92 used (66% off) $20.98 new (48% off) $35.05 direct from Amazon (13% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BJ1461.S77 1986|
|ISBN(s)||0199247501 9780199247493 9780199247509|
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