David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):1-29 (2007)
It is sometimes suggested that there are two kinds of reasoning: inferential reasoning and non-inferential reasoning. However, it is not entirely clear what the difference between these two kinds of reasoning is. In this paper, I try to answer the question what this difference is. I first discuss three answers to this question that I argue are unsatisfactory. I then give a different answer to this question, and I argue that this answer is satisfactory. I end by showing that this answer can help to resolve some disagreements in which the difference between inferential and noninferential reasoning plays a role.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Julia Staffel (2013). Can There Be Reasoning with Degrees of Belief? Synthese 190 (16):3535-3551.
Similar books and articles
Guy Politzer & Jean-françois Bonnefon (2006). Two Varieties of Conditionals and Two Kinds of Defeaters Help Reveal Two Fundamental Types of Reasoning. Mind and Language 21 (4):484–503.
Manuel Carreiras & Carlos Santamaria (1997). Reasoning About Relations: Spatial and Nonspatial Problems. Thinking and Reasoning 3 (3):191 – 208.
Mauricio Suárez (2004). An Inferential Conception of Scientific Representation. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):767-779.
Peter J. Graham (2006). Testimonial Justification: Inferential or Non-Inferential? Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):84-95.
Xavier de Donato Rodríguez & Jesús Zamora Bonilla (2009). Credibility, Idealisation, and Model Building: An Inferential Approach. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 70 (1):101 - 118.
Xavier Donato Rodríguedez & Jesús Zamora Bonilla (2009). Credibility, Idealisation, and Model Building: An Inferential Approach. Erkenntnis 70 (1).
Sara Verbrugge & Hans Smessaert (2010). On the Argumentative Strength of Indirect Inferential Conditionals. Argumentation 24 (3):337-362.
Sara Verbrugge, Kristien Dieussaert, Walter Schaeken, Hans Smessaert & William Van Belle (2007). Pronounced Inferences: A Study on Inferential Conditionals. Thinking and Reasoning 13 (2):105 – 133.
Pascal Engel (2006). Logic, Reasoning and the Logical Constants. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):219-235.
Mikkel Gerken (2012). Univocal Reasoning and Inferential Presuppositions. Erkenntnis 76 (3):373-394.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads28 ( #59,504 of 1,096,601 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #153,658 of 1,096,601 )
How can I increase my downloads?