David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Ethics 8 (2):179-196 (2004)
The purpose of this paper is to defend G. E. Moore's open question argument, understood as an argument directed against analytic reductionism, the view that moral properties are analytically reducible to non-moral properties. In the first section I revise Moore's argument in order to make it as plausible and resistant against objections as possible. In the following two sections I develop the argument further and defend it against the most prominent objections raised against it. The conclusion of my line of reasoning is that the open question argument offers the best explanation of our responses to the questions put in the argument, namely that analytic reductionism is mistaken.
|Keywords||analytic reductionism G. E. Moore moral properties naturalism naturalistic fallacy open question argument paradox of analysis|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Luciano Floridi (2013). What is A Philosophical Question? Metaphilosophy 44 (3):195-221.
Similar books and articles
Caj Strandberg (2007). Externalism and the Content of Moral Motivation. Philosophia 35 (2):249-260.
Graham Oppy (2008). The Ontological Argument. In Paul Copan & Chad V. Meister (eds.), Philosophy of Religion: Classic and Contemporary Issues. Blackwell Pub..
John J. Tilley (2008). Reasons, Rational Requirements, and the Putative Pseudo-Question “Why Be Moral?”. Synthese 161 (2):309 - 323.
David H. Sanford (1972). Begging the Question. Analysis 32 (6):197-199.
Stephen W. Ball (1988). Reductionism in Ethics and Science: A Contemporary Look at G. E. Moore's Open-Question Argument. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (3):197 - 213.
Ned Markosian (1995). The Open Past. Philosophical Studies 79 (1):95 - 105.
Andrew Altman (2004). Breathing Life Into a Dead Argument: G.E. Moore and the Open Question. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 117 (3):395-408.
Mark van Roojen (2006). Knowing Enough to Disagree: A New Response to the Moral Twin Earth Argument. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies In Metaethics, Volume 1. Clarendon Press. 161-94.
Chris Heathwood (2009). Moral and Epistemic Open-Question Arguments. Philosophical Books 50 (2):83-98.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads199 ( #3,654 of 1,413,407 )
Recent downloads (6 months)12 ( #17,859 of 1,413,407 )
How can I increase my downloads?