Is Moral Internalism Supported by Folk Intuitions?

Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):319-335 (2013)
In the metaethical debate on moral internalism and externalism, appeal is constantly made to people’s intuitions about the connection between moral judgments and motivation. However, internalists and externalists disagree considerably about their content. In this paper, we present an empirical study of laymen’s intuitions about this connection. We found that they lend surprisingly little support to the most celebrated versions of internalism, which provide reasons to be skeptical of the evidential basis for these views.
Keywords Internalism   Externalism   Moral Judgment   Moral Motivation   Experimental Philosophy   Intuition
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DOI 10.1080/09515089.2012.667622
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PhilPapers Archive Caj Strandberg, Is Moral Internalism Supported by Folk Intuitions?
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