David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):227-257 (2003)
It is sometimes said that reasoning, thought and judgement essentially involve action. It is sometimes said that they involve spontaneity, where spontaneity is taken to be connected in some constitutive way with action-intentional, voluntary and indeed free action. There is, however, a fundamental respect in which reason, thought and judgement neither are nor can be a matter of action; and any spontaneity they involve can be connected with freedom only when the word 'freedom' is used in the Spinozan-Kantian sense according to which freedom is a matter of 'rational necessitation', determination by reason
|Keywords||Epistemology Judgment Reasoning Spontaneity Thought|
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Peter Langland-Hassan (2008). Fractured Phenomenologies: Thought Insertion, Inner Speech, and the Puzzle of Extraneity. Mind and Language 23 (4):369-401.
Alexander Jackson (2011). Appearances, Rationality, and Justified Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):564-593.
Josefa Toribio (2011). What We Do When We Judge. Dialectica 65 (3):345-367.
Paulo Sousa & Lauren Swiney (2013). Thought Insertion: Abnormal Sense of Thought Agency or Thought Endorsement? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):637-654.
Tillmann Vierkant (2013). Mental Muscles and the Extended Will. Topoi 33 (1):1-9.
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