David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Bayesian conﬁrmation theory—abbreviated to in these notes—is the predominant approach to conﬁrmation in late twentieth century philosophy of science. It has many critics, but no rival theory can claim anything like the same following. The popularity of the Bayesian approach is due to its ﬂexibility, its apparently effortless handling of various technical problems, the existence of various a priori arguments for its validity, and its injection of subjective and contextual elements into the process of conﬁrmation in just the places where critics of earlier approaches had come to think that subjectivity and sensitivity to context were necessary.
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