Probability Out Of Determinism

In Claus Beisbart & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Probabilities in Physics. Oxford University Press 339--364 (2011)
This paper offers a metaphysics of physical probability in (or if you prefer, truth conditions for probabilistic claims about) deterministic systems based on an approach to the explanation of probabilistic patterns in deterministic systems called the method of arbitrary functions. Much of the appeal of the method is its promise to provide an account of physical probability on which probability assignments have the ability to support counterfactuals about frequencies. It is argued that the eponymous arbitrary functions are of little philosophical use, but that they can be substituted for facts about frequencies without losing the ability to provide counterfactual support. The result is an account of probability in deterministic systems that has a “propensity-like” look and feel, yet which requires no supplement to the standard modern empiricist tool kit of particular matters of fact and principles of physical dynamics.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,879
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Jacob Rosenthal (2012). Probabilities as Ratios of Ranges in Initial-State Spaces. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 21 (2):217-236.
Michael Strevens (2012). Précis of Depth. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2):447-460.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

93 ( #29,163 of 1,725,164 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

9 ( #72,301 of 1,725,164 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.