David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 66 (3):353 - 374 (2007)
What is the relation between entailment and reasons for belief? In this paper, I discuss several answers to this question, and I argue that these answers all face problems. I then propose the following answer: for all propositions p 1,…,p n and q, if the conjunction of p 1,…, and p n entails q, then there is a reason against a person’s both believing that p 1,…, and that p n and believing the negation of q. I argue that this answer avoids the problems that the other answers to this question face, and that it does not face any other problems either. I end by showing what the relation between deductive logic, reasons for belief and reasoning is if this answer is correct.
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1973). Belief, Truth and Knowledge. London,Cambridge University Press.
John Broome (1999). Normative Requirements. Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
Roderick M. Chisholm (1980). A Version of Foundationalism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):543-564.
David Christensen (1994). Conservatism in Epistemology. Noûs 28 (1):69-89.
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