Erkenntnis 66 (3):353 - 374 (2007)
|Abstract||What is the relation between entailment and reasons for belief? In this paper, I discuss several answers to this question, and I argue that these answers all face problems. I then propose the following answer: for all propositions p 1,…,p n and q, if the conjunction of p 1,…, and p n entails q, then there is a reason against a person’s both believing that p 1,…, and that p n and believing the negation of q. I argue that this answer avoids the problems that the other answers to this question face, and that it does not face any other problems either. I end by showing what the relation between deductive logic, reasons for belief and reasoning is if this answer is correct.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Douglas W. Portmore (2011). The Teleological Conception of Practical Reasons. Mind 120 (477):117-153.
Kevin McCain (2012). The Interventionist Account of Causation and the Basing Relation. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):357-382.
Ulrike Heuer (2010). Reasons and Impossibility. Philosophical Studies 147 (2).
Andrew Reisner (2007). Evidentialism and the Numbers Game. Theoria 73 (4):304-316.
Yakir Levin (2004). Cartesians, Strawsonians and the Univocal Meaning of Mental Predicates. Acta Analytica 19 (32):91-106.
Jennifer Lackey (2008). What Should We Do When We Disagree? In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oup.
John Skorupski (2009). The Unity and Diversity of Reasons. In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason. Oxford University Press.
Bart Streumer (2007). Inferential and Non-Inferential Reasoning. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):1-29.
Roger White (2010). You Just Believe That Because…. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):573-615.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads10 ( #106,438 of 549,426 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,397 of 549,426 )
How can I increase my downloads?