Red and 'red'
Synthese 78 (February):193-232 (1989)
| Abstract | THIS PAPER ARGUES FOR THE CLAIM THAT ALTHOUGH COLOUR WORDS LIKE 'RED' ARE, ESSENTIALLY, 'PHENOMENAL-QUALITY' WORDS—I.E., WORDS FOR PROPERTIES WHOSE WHOLE AND ESSENTIAL NATURE CAN BE AND IS FULLY REVEALED IN SENSORY EXPERIENCE, GIVEN ONLY THE QUALITATIVE CHARACTER THAT THAT EXPERIENCE HAS—STILL 'RED' CANNOT BE SUPPOSED TO BE A WORD THAT PICKS OUT OR DENOTES ANY PARTICULAR PHENOMENAL QUALITY. THE ARGUMENT RESTS ESSENTIALLY ON THE SUPPOSITION, OFTEN DISCUSSED UNDER THE HEADING OF THE 'COLOR-SPECTRUM INVERSION ARGUMENT', THAT TWO PEOPLE COULD POSSIBLY AGREE IN ALL THEIR COLOUR-JUDGEMENTS WHILE DIFFERING IN THEIR COLOUR EXPERIENCE. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Language Metaphysics Property Quality Semantics c | |||||||||
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Murat Aydede (2003). Is Introspection Inferential? In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.
Nenad Miščević (2004). Response-Intentionalism About Color. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):179-191.
Mark Siebel (2000). Red Watermelons and Large Elephants: A Case Against Compositionality? Theoria 15 (38):263-280.
Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). Colors and Color Spaces. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 5: Epistemology. Charlottesville: Philosophy Documentation Center.
Frank Jackson (2007). Colour for Representationalists. Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):169--85.
Michael A. Smith (1986). Peacocke on Red and Red. Synthese 68 (September):559-576.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & David Sparrow (2002). A Light Theory of Color. Philosophical Studies 110 (3):267-284.
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