Realistic Materialist Monism

In S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak & D. Chalmers (eds.), Towards a Science of Consciousness III (1999)
Short version of 'Real materialism', given at Tucson III Conference, 1998. (1) physicalism is true (2) the qualitative character of experience is real, as most naively understood ... so (3) the qualitative character of experience (considered specifically as such) is wholly physical. ‘How can consciousness possibly be physical, given what we know about the physical?’ To ask this question is already to have gone wrong. We have no good reason (as Priestley and Russell and others observe) to think that we know anything about the physical that gives us any reason to find any problem in the idea that consciousness is wholly physical.
Keywords materialism  consciousness  Russell  ‘the having is the knowing’  experience  mind-body problem  matter  monism  physicalism
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PhilPapers Archive Galen Strawson, Realistic Materialist Monism
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