David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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European Journal of Philosophy 17 (4):559-570 (2009)
Abstract: This paper is an attempt to identify and to suggest reasons to reject those assumptions about the nature and scope of perceptual knowledge that appear to make an unacceptable scepticism the only strictly defensible answer to the philosophical problem of knowledge of the world in general. The suggestion is that our knowing things about the world around us by perception can be satisfactorily explained only if we can be understood to sometimes perceive that such-and-such is so, where what we perceive to be so is the very state of the world that we thereby know to be so. This is not proposed as a better answer to the philosophical problem, but as a way of seeing how that problem as traditionally understood could not really present a threat to anyone who can think about the world at all.
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References found in this work BETA
James Pryor (2000). The Skeptic and the Dogmatist. Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
René Descartes (1984). The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Cambridge University Press.
Penelope Maddy (2007). Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Chris Ranalli (2014). Luck, Propositional Perception, and the Entailment Thesis. Synthese 191 (6):1223-1247.
Barry Stroud (2013). Doing Something Intentionally and Knowing That You Are Doing It. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):1-12.
Kaplan Hasanoglu (2016). Against the Conditional Correctness of Scepticism. South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):82-91.
Barry Stroud (2009). Explaining Perceptual Knowledge: Reply to Quassim Cassam. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (4):590-596.
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