David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Analysis 63 (4):332–337 (2003)
According to one formulation of Scanlon’s contractualist principle, certain acts are wrong if they are permitted by principles that are reasonably rejectable because they permit such acts. According to the redundancy objection, if a principle is reasonably rejectable because it permits actions which have feature F, such actions are wrong simply in virtue of having F and not because their having F makes principles permitting them reasonably rejectable. Consequently Scanlon’s contractualist principle adds nothing to the reasons we have not to act wrongly and is redundant.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Roger Crisp (2009). Goodness and Reasons: A Response to Stratton-Lake. Mind 118 (472):1095-1099.
Derek Parfit (2003). Justifiability to Each Person. Ratio 16 (4):368–390.
Tamra Frei (2009). The Redundancy Objection, and Why Scanlon is Not a Contractualist. Journal of Political Philosophy 17 (1):47-65.
Brad Hooker (2003). Contractualism, Spare Wheel, Aggregation. In Matt Matravers (ed.), Scanlon and Contractualism. Frank Cass. 53-76.
Philip Stratton–Lake (2003). Scanlon's Contractualism and the Redundancy Objection. Analysis 63 (277):70–76.
Jussi Suikkanen (2005). Contractualist Replies to the Redundancy Objections. Theoria 71 (1):38-58.
David McNaughton & Piers Rawling (2003). Can Scanlon Avoid Redundancy by Passing the Buck? Analysis 63 (4):328–331.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads18 ( #77,043 of 1,017,170 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #65,012 of 1,017,170 )
How can I increase my downloads?