Graduate studies at Western
Synthese 19 (1-2):393-412 (1968)
|Abstract||The aim is to uncover the foundations of quine's distinction between definite singular terms and general terms in predicative position, And hence of the general schema of predication, 'fx'. While each term in such a predication specifies its own item, The items so specified exhibit a typical difference exemplified in the basic case by the difference between spatio-Temporal particulars and properties of such particulars. A generally consequential difference of role is that while both terms are applied to the item of lower type, Only the definite singular term has the function of identifying it|
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