In D. M. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, second edition (2006)
|Abstract||The posthumous publication, in 1763, of Thomas Bayes’ “Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances” inaugurated a revolution in the understanding of the confirmation of scientific hypotheses—two hundred years later. Such a long period of neglect, followed by such a sweeping revival, ensured that it was the inhabitants of the latter half of the twentieth century above all who determined what it was to take a “Bayesian approach” to scientific reasoning.|
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