David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press 441-460 (2002)
The shortest form of the Basic Argument against free will and moral responsibility runs as follows:  When you act, you do what you do—in the situation in which you find yourself—because of the way you are.  If you do what you do because of the way you are, then in order to be fully and ultimately responsible for what you do you must be fully and ultimately responsible for the way you are. But  You cannot be fully and ultimately responsible for the way you are. So  You cannot be fully and ultimately responsible for what you do. This paper restates the Basic Argument and varies it in several different ways.
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Citations of this work BETA
Alfred R. Mele (2006). Free Will and Luck. Oxford University Press.
Alfred R. Mele (2007). Free Will and Luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.
Kristin Mickelson (2015). The Zygote Argument is Invalid: Now What? Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2911-2929.
John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini (2011). The Physiognomy of Responsibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):381-417.
Alfred Mele (2013). Moral Responsibility and the Continuation Problem. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):237-255.
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