David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):515-537 (2001)
This paper examines the standard Bayesian solution to the Quine–Duhem problem, the problem of distributing blame between a theory and its auxiliary hypotheses in the aftermath of a failed prediction. The standard solution, I argue, begs the question against those who claim that the problem has no solution. I then provide an alternative Bayesian solution that is not question-begging and that turns out to have some interesting and desirable properties not possessed by the standard solution. This solution opens the way to a satisfying treatment of a problem concerning ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses.
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Laura E. Schulz, Noah D. Goodman, Joshua B. Tenenbaum & Adrianna C. Jenkins (2008). Going Beyond the Evidence: Abstract Laws and Preschoolers’ Responses to Anomalous Data. Cognition 109 (2):211-223.
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Lydia McGrew (2014). On Not Counting the Cost: Ad Hocness and Disconfirmation. Acta Analytica 29 (4):491-505.
Jacob Stegenga (2013). An Impossibility Theorem for Amalgamating Evidence. Synthese 190 (12):2391-2411.
Joe Morrison (2010). Just How Controversial is Evidential Holism? Synthese 173 (3):335-352.
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