The distinctive wrong in lying

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):171 - 179 (2010)
In this essay I will argue, as does Bernard Williams, that lying and misleading are both commonly wrong because they involve an aim to breach a trust. I will also argue, contrary to Williams, that lying and misleading threaten trust differently, and that when they are wrong, they are wrong differently. Indeed, lying may be wrong when misleading is not.
Keywords Lying  Mislead  Trust
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DOI 10.2307/40602553
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References found in this work BETA
Bernard Williams (2002). Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Alan Strudler (2005). Deception Unraveled. Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):458 - 473.
Piers Benn & Suzanne Uniacke (1995). Permissible Killing. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):550.

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