The distinctive wrong in lying

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):171 - 179 (2010)
In this essay I will argue, as does Bernard Williams, that lying and misleading are both commonly wrong because they involve an aim to breach a trust. I will also argue, contrary to Williams, that lying and misleading threaten trust differently, and that when they are wrong, they are wrong differently. Indeed, lying may be wrong when misleading is not.
Keywords Lying  Mislead  Trust
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    References found in this work BETA
    Piers Benn & Suzanne Uniacke (1995). Permissible Killing. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):550.
    Alan Strudler (2005). Deception Unraveled. Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):458 - 473.
    Bernard Williams (2002). Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
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