David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):171 - 179 (2010)
In this essay I will argue, as does Bernard Williams, that lying and misleading are both commonly wrong because they involve an aim to breach a trust. I will also argue, contrary to Williams, that lying and misleading threaten trust differently, and that when they are wrong, they are wrong differently. Indeed, lying may be wrong when misleading is not.
|Keywords||Lying Mislead Trust|
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References found in this work BETA
Bernard Williams (2002). Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Richard Moran (2005). Getting Told and Being Believed. Philosophers' Imprint 5 (5):1-29.
Peter Geach (1977). The Virtues: The Stanton Lectures 1973-74. Cambridge University Press.
Piers Benn & Suzanne Uniacke (1995). Permissible Killing. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):550.
Alan Strudler (2005). Deception Unraveled. Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):458 - 473.
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