Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):77–90 (1999)
|Abstract||Ethical intuitionists are often criticised on the ground that their view makes it possible for an agent to believe that she ought to ? whilst lacking any motive to ?-that is, on the ground that it involves, or implies a form of externalism. I begin by distinguishing this form of externalism (what I call 'belief externalism') from two other forms of ethical externalism-moral externalism, and reasons externalism. I then consider various reasons why one might think that ethical intuitionism is defective in so far as it involves, or implies belief externalism, and argue that these objections are unpersuasive|
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