David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Science is epistemically special, or so I will assume: it is better able to produce knowledge about the workings of the world than other knowledge-directed pursuits. Further, its superior epistemic powers are due to its being in some sense especially empirical: in particular, science puts great weight on a form of inductive reasoning that I call empirical con rmation. My aim in this paper is to investigate the nature of science’s “empiricism”, and to provide a preliminary explanation of the connection between empirical confirmation and epistemic efficacy. I will try to convince you that the place to find an account of empirical confirmation is the dusty, long-neglected instantialist account of scientific inference offered by mid-century logical empiricists. Some revision of instantialism will be required. As for what is advantageous in empirical confirmation, I propose that it is an unusual degree of independence from background belief.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Mario Bunge (1960). The Place of Induction in Science. Philosophy of Science 27 (3):262-270.
Ingo Brigandt (2010). Scientific Reasoning Is Material Inference: Combining Confirmation, Discovery, and Explanation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):31-43.
Vincenzo Crupi, Katya Tentori & and Michel Gonzalez (2007). On Bayesian Measures of Evidential Support: Theoretical and Empirical Issues. Philosophy of Science 74 (2):229-252.
Elisabeth A. Lloyd (1987). Confirmation of Ecological and Evolutionary Models. Biology and Philosophy 2 (3):277-293.
Sharyn Clough (2008). Solomon's Empirical/Non-Empirical Distinction and the Proper Place of Values in Science. Perspectives on Science 16 (3):pp. 265-279.
Shelby D. Hunt (1994). A Realist Theory of Empirical Testing Resolving the Theory-Ladenness/ Objectivity Debate. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 24 (2):133-158.
Mehmet Elgin (2003). Biology and a Priori Laws. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1380--1389.
Abner Shimony (1994). Empirical and Rational Components in Scientific Confirmation. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:146 - 155.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads26 ( #66,304 of 1,100,851 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #289,727 of 1,100,851 )
How can I increase my downloads?