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Clarendon Press (2003)
Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet present eleven original essays on weakness of will, a topic straddling the divide between moral philosophy and philosophy of mind, and the subject of much current attention. An international team of established scholars and younger talent provide perspectives on all the key issues in this fascinating debate; the book will be essential reading for anyone working in the area. Issues covered include classical questions, such as the distinction between weakness and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgment and motivation, the role of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existence of the will. They also include new topics, such as group akrasia, strength of will, the nature of correct choice, the structure of decision theory, the temporality of prudential reasons, and emotional rationality. Because these questions cut across philosophy of mind and ethics, the collection will be essential reading for scholars, postgraduates, and upper-level undergraduates in both these fields.
|Keywords||Will Practical reason|
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|Call number||BF619.W43 2007|
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Citations of this work BETA
Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield (2007). Finking Frankfurt. Philosophical Studies 135 (3):363--74.
Chandra Sekhar Sripada (2010). Philosophical Questions About the Nature of Willpower. Philosophy Compass 5 (9):793–805.
Gregory Strom (2014). Deviant Causal Chains, Knowledge of Reasons, and Akrasia. Topoi 33 (1):67-76.
Tatuya Kashiwabata (2008). Akurasia, Higher-Orderness, and Diachronic Rationality. Kagaku Tetsugaku 41 (2):45-58.
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