David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Religious Studies 37 (3):351-355 (2001)
The idea of a sum (or even average) of pleasure or value occurs in a number of philosophical discussions, But it has been challenged, and it seems to lead to paradoxical conclusions. Rashdall defended it by citing cases where it clearly applied; but it turns out hard to assign quantities to values without being arbitrary. It is argued here that we can only ‘do sums’ where like is being compared with like. In other cases, we begin by judging which of two possible states of affairs would be the better, and only then are in a position to speak (if we choose) of sums of goodness. The implications of this for certain forms of utilitarianism and theodicy are briefly considered.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Delio (2009). Is Creation Really Good? American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 83 (1):3 - 22.
Scott MacDonald (1992). Goodness as Transcendental: The Early Thirteenth-Century Recovery of an Aristotelian Idea. Topoi 11 (2):173-186.
Mark Wynn (1999). Natural Theology In an Ecological Mode. Faith and Philosophy 16 (1):27-42.
Imtiaz Moosa (2002). Does the Failure of Utilitarianism Justify a Belief in Intrinsic Value? Philo 5 (2):123-142.
Samantha Vice (2005). On the Tedium of the Good. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):459 - 476.
David Keyt (2007). The Good Man and the Upright Citizen in Aristotle's Ethics and Politics. Social Philosophy and Policy 24 (2):220-240.
Roger Crisp (2008). Goodness and Reasons: Accentuating the Negative. Mind 117 (466):257-265.
Peter Vallentyne & Shelly Kagan (1997). Infinite Value and Finitely Additive Value Theory. Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):5-26.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads4 ( #251,104 of 1,098,129 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #172,576 of 1,098,129 )
How can I increase my downloads?