Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):51 – 61 (2003)
|Abstract||In 'Subjunctive Conditionals: Two Parameters vs. Three' Pavel Tichy articulates and defends a three-parameter account of counterfactuals. In the paper, he responds to a well known objection against the validity of various forms of inference, in particular strengthening of the antecedent, contraposition, and hypothetical syllogism. In this paper, I argue that his response to the objection is inadequate. I then propose an alternative form of the three-parameter account of counterfactuals that avoids the objection in question.|
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