Enkinaesthesia: The fundamental challenge for machine consciousness

Abstract
In this short paper I will introduce an idea which, I will argue, presents a fundamental additional challenge to the machine consciousness community. The idea takes the questions surrounding phenomenology, qualia and phenomenality one step further into the realm of intersubjectivity but with a twist, and the twist is this: that an agent’s intersubjective experience is deeply felt and necessarily co-affective; it is enkinaesthetic, and only through enkinaesthetic awareness can we establish the affective enfolding which enables first the perturbation, and then the balance and counter-balance, the attunement and co-ordination of whole-body interaction through reciprocal adaptation.
Keywords Machine Consciousness  Enkinaesthesia  Phenomenal consciousness
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    References found in this work BETA
    Piotr Boltuc (2009). The Philosophical Issue in Machine Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (01):155-176.
    Ron Chrisley (2009). Synthetic Phenomenology. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (01):53-70.

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