Kant and the Scientific Study of Consciousness

History of the Human Sciences 23 (3):48-71 (2010)
Abstract
We argue that Kant’s views about consciousness, the mind-body problem, and the status of psychology as a science all differ drastically from the way in which these topics are conjoined in present debates about the prominent idea of a science of consciousness. Kant did never use the concept of consciousness in the now dominant sense of phenomenal qualia; his discussions of the mind-body problem center not on the reducibility of mental properties but of substances; and his views about the possibility of psychology as a science did not employ the requirement of a mechanistic explanation, but of quantification of phenomena. This shows strikingly how deeply philosophical problems and conceptions can change even if they look similar on the surface.
Keywords Kant  consciousness  qualia  introspection  psychology  materialism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,826
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Katharina T. Kraus (2011). Kant and the 'Soft Sciences'. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (4):618-624.
Similar books and articles
Christopher S. Hill (2009). Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
Dennis Schulting (2012). Non-Apperceptive Consciousness. In Riccardo Pozzo, Piero Giordanetti & Marco Sgarbi (eds.), Kant's Philosophy of the Unconscious. de Gruyter.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-10-25

Total downloads

36 ( #50,960 of 1,100,145 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

10 ( #24,072 of 1,100,145 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.