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- Scott Sturgeon (2008). Reason and the Grain of Belief. Noûs 42 (1):139–165.
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This paper explains what it is to believe something for a reason. My thesis is that you believe something for a reason just in case the reason non-deviantly causes your belief. In the course of arguing for my thesis, I present a new argument that reasons are causes, and offer an informative account of causal non-deviance.
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Can belief in God can be meritorious if not epistemically rational in the ordinary way? I argue that the primary condition to be met if a belief is to be meritoriousis that it is based on a good reason, and that to believe that something is so on the grounds that it would be good if it were can be to believe for a good reason.In particular I argue that to believe in God on the grounds that it would be good if He existed can be to believe for a good reason, and that such a belief can,therefore, be meritorious.
This paper offers an account of the historical development of Kant's understanding of belief ( Glaube ) from its early ties to George Friedrich Meier's Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre through various stages of refinement. It will be argued that the Critique of Pure Reason reflects an important but not final stage in Kant's understanding of belief. Its structure is further refined and its scope narrowed in later works, including the Critique of Practical Reason and Critique of Judgment . After charting these stages, an analysis of how belief relates to the Fact of Reason will be presented.
Davidson claims that nothing can count as a reason for a belief except another belief. This claim is challenged by McDowell, who holds that perceptual experiences can count as reasons for beliefs. I argue that McDowell fails to take account of a distinction between two different senses in which something can count as a reason for belief. While a non-doxastic experience can count as a reason for belief in one of the two senses, this is not the sense which is presupposed in Davidson's claim. While I focus on McDowell's view, the argument generalizes to other views which take experiences as reasons for belief.
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Belief and its benefits -- Belief, reason, goodness -- Belief and the unknown -- Obstacles to belief -- Belief and meaning -- Learning to believe -- Believing and living.
Discussion of Scott Sturgeon, Reason and the grain of belief
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