David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):73-95 (2007)
This essay is a plea for the view that philosophers should analyze the concept of self-deception more with the aim of having useful applications for empirical research. This is especially desirable because psychologists often use different, even incompat-ible conceptions of self-deception when investigating the factual conditions and con-sequences, as well as the very existence, of the phenomenon. At the same time, philosophers who exploit psychological research on human cognition and reasoning in order to better understand self-deception fail to realize that these theories and data are loaded with problematic assumptions. More specifically, I discuss what conceptions of rationality are assumed when we describe cases of self-deception as either irra-tional or as adaptively rational, and how competing ontological models of the self ap-pear in different accounts of self-deception. I argue, first, that although the self typically is an object of such deception, it is not always so. Secondly, while it is the subject of deception, it is so only in a moderate way: We need neither assume multi-ple selves, nor is self-deception typically brought about or sustained intentionally. However, the avoidance of self-deception is at least sometimes under the subject’s ra-tional control. This account does not take for granted the existence of the phenomenon of self-deception. It is a serious task of empirical research to figure out whether self-deception really occurs. This issue also depends on the question ignored until now of what normative conception of rationality is assumed when one views certain beliefs as self-deceptive.
|Keywords||Self-deception intentionalism, non-intentionalism psychology rationality heuristics and biases|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Robert Audi (1997). Self-Deception Vs. Self-Caused Deception: A Comment on Professor Mele. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):104-104.
Alfred R. Mele (1997). Understanding and Explaining Real Self-Deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):127-134.
Clancy W. Martin (ed.) (2009). The Philosophy of Deception. Oxford University Press.
Jordi Fernández (2013). Self-Deception and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):379-400.
Stanley Paluch (1967). Self-Deception. Inquiry 10 (1-4):268-278.
Howard Rachlin & Marvin Frankel (1997). The Uses of Self-Deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):124-125.
Lisa Damm (2011). Self-Deception About Emotion. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):254-270.
William N. Whisner (1993). Self-Deception and Other-Person Deception: Toward a New Conceptualization of Self- Deception. Philosophia 22 (3-4):223-240.
Annette C. Baier (1996). The Vital but Dangerous Art of Ignoring: Selective Attention and Self-Deception. In Roger T. Ames & Wimal Dissanayake (eds.), Self and Deception: A Cross-Cultural Philosophical Enquiry. Albany: SUNY Press.
Mario Heilmann (1997). Self-Deceived About Self-Deception: An Evolutionary Analysis. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):116-117.
Carla Bagnoli (2012). Self-Deception: A Constructivist Account. Humana.Mente 20:93-116.
Alfred R. Mele (1999). Twisted Self-Deception. Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):117-137.
Neil Van Leeuwen (2013). Self-Deception. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
Annette Barnes (1997). Seeing Through Self-Deception. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Added to index2011-10-25
Total downloads31 ( #81,317 of 1,696,587 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #186,867 of 1,696,587 )
How can I increase my downloads?