Visual experience

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (1):179-200 (1998)
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Abstract

I argue against a Disjunctive approach to visual experience. I then critique three 'common-factor' views: Qualia Theory, Intentionalism and Sense-Date Theory. The latter two are combined to form Intentional Trope Theory; and that view is defended

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Scott Sturgeon
University of Birmingham

Citations of this work

Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
The limits of self-awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.
Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
The Problem of Perception.Tim Crane - 2005 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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