David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 90 (1):1-26 (1992)
Oscar is going to be the first artificial person — at any rate, he is going to be the first artificial person to be built in Tucson's Philosophy Department. Oscar's creator, John Pollock, maintains that once Oscar is complete he will experience qualia, will be self-conscious, will have desires, fears, intentions, and a full range of mental states (Pollock 1989, pp. ix–x). In this paper I focus on what seems to me to be the most problematical of these claims, viz., that Oscar will experience qualia. I argue that we have not been given sufficient reasons to believe this bold claim. I doubt that Oscar will enjoy qualitative conscious phenomena and I maintain that it will be like nothing to be Oscar
|Keywords||Consciousness Epistemology Machine Qualia Sensation|
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Nagel (1979/2012). Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press.
Paul M. Churchland (1979). Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
Nicholas Humphrey (1984). Consciousness Regained: Chapters in the Development of Mind. Oxford University Press.
John Haugeland (ed.) (1981). Mind Design. MIT Press.
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